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Abstract
The last four decades have seen a return of high-earning households to central cities.
The consequences are urban renewal on the one hand and soaring inner-city rents on the
other. In this paper I extend a monocentric city model of income sorting and urban rents
to examine whether increases in the number of two-earner households can explain recent
patterns of gentrification. I then present evidence from Washington DC that, among the
young and married, the rich are shortening their commutes while the poor are lengthening
theirs. However, among the unmarried, no such trend is discernible. These facts support the
model’s prediction that two-earner households have reshaped the landscape of urban income
group sorting.
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1 Introduction
The spatial structure of urban housing prices in the United States has undergone
substantial change in recent decades. In 1980, homes within 2 miles of the city center
carried lower prices on average than homes 10 miles distant. By 2010, housing prices
were decreasing nearly monotonically with distance from downtown (Edlund et al.
2015). The change in central city prices was accompanied by a demographic shift.
While low-income residents had been leaving the inner city for almost three decades,
by the turn of the millennium the college-educated were flowing back into the city
center (Baum-Snow et al. 2016).
These phenomena—which are referred to collectively as “urban renewal” or “gen-
trification” depending on normative intent—demand a positive explanation. During
this period, female labor force participation has risen steadily (McGrattan 2008). A
household with two earners will have more cash on hand, but fewer hours of non-
work time compared to a single-earner household. This will induce dual-earners to
pay higher rents in order to avoid long commutes by locating more centrally. But, if
low-skill workers occupy the city center already, will it be the poor dual-earners or
the rich dual-earners who end up renting the inner-city apartments? To think about
this question rigorously, we need an economic model. In this paper, I use a model of
urban housing prices to explain how a transition from single-earning to dual-earning
households explains why skilled workers are shortening their commutes.
The standard neoclassical approach to studying housing prices across space is the
theory of spatial equilibrium (Glaeser 2010). This theory suggests that if individuals
are free to move to whichever location they wish, then prices will adjust so that utility
for each group is equal across all locations. More productive cities might offer higher
wages, but they will also carry higher housing rents or more severe traffic congestion.
Spatial equilibrium theory can also explain price variation among districts within
a single metro. The Alonso-Muth-Mills “Monocentric City” model (Duranton et al.
2015) uses the assumption that all workers commute to the city center to predict
two outcomes. First, because transportation costs are lowest near the city center,
inner zones will experience higher land prices than outer zones. Second, whether
high-income residents occupy the inner city or the suburbs depends upon whether
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the principal cost of transportation is time or money.
Applications of spatial equilibrium theory to gentrification are still emerging.
Edlund et al. (2015) tell a human capital story. As returns to skill rose in the
1980s and 90s, educated workers supplied more labor. Thus, leisure time decreased
and the marginal value of leisure rose. In this way, high-income households bid up
the prices of homes close to the city center in order to cut down on increasingly
costly commute time. Their analysis of tract-level Census data finds evidence that
increases in city-wide skilled labor demand were associated with greater home price
increases close to the city center. Furthermore, the increases in college-educated
population that accompanied labor demand rises were largest in the inner city.
However, Gyourko et al. (2013) propose that national shocks also drive gentri-
fication of entire metros. In their framework, some cities have relatively elastic
housing supplies and some have inelastic housing supplies. Furthermore, some cities
are more “desirable” to live in than others. When aggregate demand for housing
rises nationally, the desirable cities with the least elastic housing supplies should
experience the greatest rent growth, which will price out the poor. Thus, gentrifica-
tion also involves the flight of low-income residents from housing-inelastic cities to
housing-elastic cities in response to rising numbers of high-income households. The
authors express these ideas in a two-location spatial equilibrium model. They test
the model’s implications with a panel of city-level Census data. Their evidence sug-
gests that even heterogeneous price growth across different cities can be explained
by increases in national housing demand. From this perspective, gentrification is
driven by rises in national demand, whose local effects depend upon the elasticity
of the local housing supply.
Other cross-city work is gaining momentum (Diamond 2016, Chetty 2014). Dia-
mond (2016) in particular derives a several-city structural model which explains how
metro-wide changes in amenities and labor demand lead to changes in the distribu-
tion of college-educated workers across different cities. However, Diamond’s theory
does not model this distribution across space within a metro. Indeed, Section 2 will
show that changes in the spatial sorting of income groups within Washington DC
have been substantial.
Rappaport (2014) uses a fully structural spatial equilibrium model that considers
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both inter-city and intra-city decision-making. This model numerically simulates
realistic population and rent gradients in a general equilibrium setting. Even traffic
congestion and highway construction are explicitly modeled. Rappaport’s model has
a very broad scope, but is not built for answering questions of gentrification because
workers all share one skill level.
Any study of gentrification must inevitably confront the puzzle of consumption
amenities. All of the above-mentioned studies acknowledge the importance of local
differences in quality of life. Amenities matter a great deal (Hwang et al. 2016,
Gyourko 2013). But, how exactly they matter is not known because the very term
“amenities” is an ad hoc concept meant to capture whatever local idiosyncrasies a
model does not explicitly consider. To complicate the problem further, amenities
probably both attract and are attracted by high-income residents. The endogeneity
makes amenities difficult to ignore since they are correlated with everything and will
be a never-ending source of bias in most empirical studies.
Simulations can address this concern. Rappaport (2008) calibrates a computa-
tional two-city model of population and quality-of-life. He finds that differences in
consumption amenities are associated with compensating variation equal to 30% of
consumption expenditure can account for observed differences in population among
US cities. The computational result is highly suggestive. Yet, we lack sharp state-
ments on how local amenities might confound study of local labor demand (e.g.,
Edlund et al. 2015) because closed form solutions are lacking.
Nevertheless, as salient as amenities are, it seems plausible that they follow and
magnify existing gentrification instead of causing it in the first place. As Edlund
et al. (2015) put it, centrality is the most important amenity. They argue that
rising skilled labor demand induces the rich to work longer hours and shorten their
commutes relative to the poor.
However, this explanation does not mesh well with economic theories of housing
price change. Traditional models predict that the rich prefer the suburbs because
they like to use their greater buying power to purchase more land (Duranton et al.
2015). These models predict that rental prices in central areas are high enough to
transfer any savings from short commutes to landlords. Thus, it seems that if the rich
experience an increase in wage, they may purchase more housing by moving outward,
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purchase more leisure by moving inward, or purchase more leisure by working fewer
hours. In other words, a movement inward is one of a host of theoretically feasible
responses on the part of the skilled to an increase in their wages.
Married women have driven the majority of increased labor supply on the part of
the skilled in recent years (McGrattan et al. 2008). Edlund et al. (2015) claim that
increasing returns to skill have driven both increases in two-income households and
gentrification. I propose that an increase in two-income households alone can explain
gentrification, even if returns to skill were to remain constant. In fact, my model
suggests that increasing returns to skill may accelerate or arrest gentrification. But,
transitioning from single to dual-earner households will almost always accelerate
gentrification and is thus a better explanation.
To show this, I will propose an extension of the traditional Alonso-Muth-Mills
(AMM) model, drawing primarily upon theory from Duranton et al. (2015), Glaeser
(2008), and Rappaport (2014). The key assumption of the AMM theory is that as
distance from the city center rises, transportation costs rise. Rents per square foot
must therefore be lower in the suburbs in order to compensate outer residents for
their extra commuting costs. The assumption that commute times are what exoge-
nously differentiates the inner city from the suburbs enjoys some empirical support.
For example Glaeser et al. (2008) find that much of the historical sorting of income
groups across “old cities” was probably driven by access to public transportation.
Simulating AMM models can be challenging because including even a small
amount of complexity can compromise tractability (Glaeser 2008). To keep the
model tractable, I will use a work hours restriction from Rappaport (2014). Unlike
Rappaport, I will introduce a reservation location and make wages exogenous. Al-
though I lose general equilibrium, these changes allow me to continuously simulate
rent and incomes at all locations in the city instead of discrete rings.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, I present stylized facts to
motivate a study of gentrification in Washington DC. In Section 3, I develop a sim-
ple model of spatial income group sorting which suggests that increasing prevalence
of two-earner households can plausibly explain patterns of gentrification in approx-
imately monocentric cities. In Section 4, I present evidence from Washington DC
suggesting that among high-earners, the married young are shortening their relative
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commutes while the unmarried are not. I conclude in Section 5 that both the theory
and the evidence argue persuasively that inner cities gentrify partially because of a
transition from single-earning households to dual-earning households.
2 Stylized Facts
In order to calibrate and evaluate my model, I must ground it in appropriate em-
pirical data. In this section, I will use maps constructed from Census microdata to
argue that Washington DC is an ideal setting to study gentrification. The following
stylized facts will show that the DC metro approximately meets the assumption of
monocentricity made by the AMM models and appears to be experiencing gentrifi-
cation.
2.1 Summary Statistics
My data come from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) maintained
by the Minnesota Population Center at the University of Minnesota (Ruggles et
al. 2015). The data are drawn from the 5-percent and 1-percent samples of the
American Communities Survey, which is conducted by the US Census Bureau. I
make use of census data covering the Chicago and Washington DC metropolitan
statistical areas. The data are from the years 1980, 2000, and 2010.
The raw data provided by IPUMS are at the individual level. My variables of in-
terest are monthly gross rent,1 yearly personal wage income, educational attainment,
commute time, transport method, and the number of bedrooms in the home.
For the motivational maps in Figures 1-12, I aggregated repeated cross-sections of
individuals from 2000 and 2010 into a panel at the level of the Public Use Microdata
Area (PUMA).2 PUMAs are geographic areas. They tend to be much larger than
census tracts and are required to have populations over 100,000 in order to preserve
anonymity. I aggregated the variables as follows. I took gross rent for individuals
living in 2-bedroom rented dwellings and wage income for individuals reporting
1Gross rent includes contract rent as well as fuel and utilities costs.
2Since PUMAs are not consistent outside of this decade, I did not make maps for 1980.
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greater than zero income at their medians. For the portion of individuals reporting
at least one year of college, the portion married, the portion under 35 years of age,
and the portion both married and under 35 years of age, I computed percents for
each PUMA. I took the minutes of commute time for individuals who commuted by
auto, truck, or van at the mean and called this the “auto” commute time. All dollar
amounts are in constant 2017 USD. All aggregations made use of the individual
sample weights provided by IPUMS. The data included 234,000 observations before
aggregation and 44 observations after aggregation.
Tables 1 and 2 provide summary statistics for the aggregated PUMA-level data
for Washington DC in 2000 and 2010 respectively. These tables also show how many
individuals were aggregated over for each variable in each year. Since commute times
were restricted to auto drivers, wages were restricted to earners, and rents were
restricted to 2-bedroom dwellings, the sample sizes for these variables are smaller
than for the demographic variables.
2.2 Motivational Maps
The AMM models assume that cities are monocentric. In other words, commute
cost and time increase with distance from the city center. This stipulation is more
realistic for some cities than others. Figure 1 shows commute time quartiles in Wash-
ington DC PUMA’s during 2010. The darker the color, the higher the quartile. I ask
the reader to consider the central square containing DC proper and Arlington to be
the “inner” city. Notice that commute times are clearly shorter in the inner city than
the broader metro. Compare this to Figure 2 of Chicago in 2010. Commute times
are very high in downtown Chicago relative to the rest of the city. Thus, monocen-
tricity seems to be a reasonable stylization of Washington DC and an unreasonable
stylization of Chicago.
Figures 1 and 2 showed that Washington DC appears to be relatively monocen-
tric. In order for it to be a good choice for my study of gentrification, we must
have evidence that it is indeed gentrifying. First, consider Figure 3, which shows
percent change in median inflation-adjusted gross rents for 2-bedroom dwellings in
Washington DC from 2000 to 2010. Notice that the inner square experiences rapid
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real rent growth compared to the rest of the metro. Similarly, Figure 4 shows that
the inner square experienced the fastest wage growth over the same period.
Can the increase in the rent and income rankings of the central zones in the
Washington DC metro be explained by demographic change? First, consider Figure
5. The portion of the population under 35 is growing rapidly in almost all of the inner
city and declining in most outer zones. Figure 6 shows that the married population
is declining throughout the metro, but rising in the inner city. According to Figure
Figure 7, the college-educated are also centralizing.
The skeptical reader may wonder whether these five trends are recent phenomena
or simply the longstanding historical trends of Washington DC. Unfortunately, my
PUMA-level data only go back to 2010. To shed light on this question, I have
included maps in Figures 8-12. These maps show absolute levels of rent, income,
college education rates, age, and marriage rates in 2000 and 2010. The takeaway
from these maps is that levels are much less concentrated in the inner city than
changes are. This is evidence that the close concentration of changes in the inner
city shown in Figures 3-7 emerged relatively recently.
These maps suggest that Washington DC is approximately monocentric and see-
ing its inner core become relatively more expensive, richer, more educated, more
married, and younger than its outer zones. Which changes are causes and which are
consequences? To explain the relationships among these movements, we need some
economic theory.
3 Theory
In this section I will define and calibrate a model of urban incomes and housing
prices across space. The model is an extension of the Alonso-Muth-Mills models
described in Duranton et al. (2015) and Glaeser (2008). It makes the standard
assumption that commute costs rise with distance from the city center. Its mission
is to show that a city of one-earner households will have a poor inner core and rich
suburbs while a city of two-earner households will have the reverse.
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3.1 Model
The model describes the behavior of two agents: the landlord and the household.
Each landlord owns a single apartment at some location in the city and will rent
it to the highest bidder. Thus, housing supply is assumed to be perfectly inelastic
and the goal of the model will be to determine the price that each income group is
willing to pay for housing at each location in the city.
Moncentricity is a major assumption of this model. That is to say, the farther a
household lives from the city center, the longer its commute distance x. Thus, if a
household lives x miles from the city center, it must pay a commuting cost of τ(x)
goods and σ(x) hours. Thus, work hours N are equal to total time endowment T
minus leisure ` minus commute time σ(x).
Following Rappaport (2014), I restrict work hours N for single-earner households
to 40 hours per week. This lends the mathematical derivations tractability and
makes the time cost of commuting more salient. The units of housing h are quality-
square-feet. So, a larger or nicer apartment is considered “more” housing.
3.1.1 The Maximization Problem
Each household seeks to maximize its utility subject to a budget constraint. The
utility function is increasing in housing h, leisure time `, and non-housing goods
consumption c. But, the household must not exceed its income, which is equal to
hours worked N times wage w. Consumption is the numeraire good, so the price of
consumption is implicitly 1. The price of housing is denoted p.
Thus, the household’s problem is to pick {x, c, h} to maximize utility subject to
its budget and time constraints.
max
x,c,h
U(c, h, `) (1)
s.t. c = wN − ph− τ(x) (2)
` = T −N − σ(x) (3)
We can write this maximization problem as a Lagrangian. We know that under
maximization, the derivatives of the Lagrangian with respect to c and h will equal
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zero. This gives us two first-order conditions.3
L = U(c, h, `) + λ(w(T − `− σ(x))− c− ph− τ(x)) (4)
c : 0 = Uc − λ (5)
h : 0 = Uh − λp (6)
Combining equations 5 and 6 gives us:
Uh
Uc
= p (7)
Notice that U`
Uc
does not necessarily equal the wage! This is because the household
cannot choose its work hours.
3.1.2 The Alonso-Muth Condition
I will now introduce the axiom of spatial equilibrium from (Glaeser 2008). According
to this principle, housing prices p adjust until expected utility is equal at every
location x. Thus, the derivative of utility with respect to x is zero.
0 =
∂
∂x
U(c, h, `) (8)
If we substitute both budget constraints into Equation 8, we have:
0 =
∂
∂x
U(w(T − `− σ(x))− ph− τ(x), h, T −N − σ(x)) (9)
Next, we totally differentiate. Since work hours N are fixed, Nx = 0. We can
substitute in Equation 7 and solve for px.
0 = Uc(wNx − pxh− phx − τx) + Uhhx + U``x (10)
0 = Uc(0− pxh− phx − τx) + Ucphx − U`σx (11)
px = −
τx +
Uh
Uc
σx
h
(12)
Equation 12 is an extended version of the Alonso-Muth Condition from Duranton
et al. (2015). If we define a utility function, we can easily take its derivatives and
obtain the housing demand, transforming Equation 12 into a first-order ordinary
3There is no need to derive the first order condition with respect to x because the spatial equilibrium introduced
in the next section renders the x decision moot.
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differential equation. The solution to this differential equation tells us the housing
price p that any household with wage w will be willing to pay at distance x from
the city center. This solution p(x,w) is called the bid-rent function.
The intuition behind the Alonso-Muth Condition is this: commute cost savings
from moving inward are exactly offset by extra housing expenditure. Clearly, housing
prices decrease monotonically with distance from the city center. Since utility is
even throughout the city and housing is a normal good, this means that housing
consumption increases with distance from the city center.
The Alonso-Muth Condition can make predictions regarding the sorting of the
rich and poor across space. Suppose that housing price bidded by the poor and the
rich are equal at some point xˆ.4 Then, whichever income group has a steeper px at
xˆ will occupy the inner city. The group with shallower xˆ will occupy the outer city.5
Since housing is a normal good, h will be larger for higher income groups, implying
a shallower px. However, since work hours are fixed, both income groups experience
the same `. Since the rich consume more h and c, Uc will be lower for the rich
and Ul will be the same or higher for the rich. Thus, both the numerator and the
denominator will be greater for the rich and which group occupies the city center
is ambiguous. Thus, in order to make predictions regarding gentrification, we must
calibrate the model and then numerically estimate the solution of the Alonso-Muth
Condition for each income group.
3.2 Functional Forms
In order to numerically estimate Equation 12, we must first define a utility func-
tion. I choose to follow Rappaport (2014) and use a nested constant elasticity of
substitution form.
U(c, h, `) =
(
η`ρ + (1− η) (δcγ + (1− δ)hγ) ργ
) 1
ρ (13)
4If wages are equal in the city and the reservation location, then the expected commute distance in the reservation
location will be such a xˆ.
5Since both bid-rent functions are decreasing monotonically in x, parameter sets with multiple xˆ are quite rare.
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An engaging exercise in calculus and algebra yields the following housing demand:
h =
wN − τ(x)(
pδ
1−δ
) 1
1−γ + p
(14)
The predictions of the model are somewhat sensitive to the choice of functional
forms for transportation costs.6 For parsimony, I use linear forms for τ(x) and σ(x).7
The Alonso-Muth Condition tells us how households hold utility constant through-
out the city. But, in order to find its solution, I must specify what the level of utility
is that households are holding constant. To do this, I give city-dwellers the option of
moving to a reservation location. The price and commute distance in the reservation
location are meant to represent the expected price and commute for the resident if
they rolled a die and moved to a random location elsewhere in the country. I then
set utility at all points in the city equal to reservation utility.
To restate this in mathematical terms, in order to numerically simulate the differ-
ential equation ∂p
∂x
we need to fix a p(0). I set p(0) equal to the price that equalizes
utility in the reservation location and utility with no commute. Price and commute
distance in the reservation location are the national means. With p(0) pinned down,
the Alonso-Muth condition can tell us the prices bid at all other points in the city.
It is the reservation location that allows us to understand how it is that the poor
can outbid the rich for an apartment. Intuitively, a member of the super-rich would
not be willing to move into a tiny apartment in a bad part of town, even if rent were
zero. This is because the rich have better options–in the reservation location. If the
tiny apartment were the only housing in the world, then the super-rich would have
the maximal bid. But, since the wealthy face the opportunity cost of the reservation
location, the poor will outbid them in some locations.
6In general, increasing goods costs or decreasing time costs will steepen the bid-function of the poor relative to
the rich, increasing the likelihood that the poor will occupy the inner city.
7The linear functional forms for commute costs imply constant speed and cost per mile. In reality, commutes
are likely to be slower and more expensive close to the city center. I do not address how much slower and more
expensive in this paper and choose the linear forms to avoid over-fitting.
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3.3 Parameters
I follow Rappaport (2014) once more to choose parameters for the utility function.
I set the elasticity of substitution between housing and all other goods to 0.33. I set
the baseline elasticity of substitution between leisure and the composite of housing
and consumption to 0.75.8 Next, I fix η such that college-educated residents in the
reservation location choose to work 40 hours per week. Finally, I fix δ such that poor
residents in the reservation location commit about 40 percent of their expenditure
on housing.9
I calibrate parameters for the budget constraints using the census data detailed
in the next section (Ruggles et al. 2015). The median hourly wage for workers with
a high school diploma only was $11.24 in 2010.10 For workers with a bachelor’s
degree, the median hourly wage was $26.34. Finally, I use the mean national rent
for a one-bedroom dwelling $896 as the housing price in the reservation location.
Next, I calibrate transportation costs per mile. The Internal Revenue Service
(IRS, 2010) allowed individuals to deduct $0.56 per business mile driven in 2010.
I use this as a rough approximation of auto commute costs. Thus, τ(x) = 0.56x.
Since my data do not include commute distance, I draw on a document published
by the Bureau of Transportation (2003) which states that the mean commute in the
United States in 2003 was approximately 15 miles in 26.4 minutes. I use this to fix
expected national transportation speed at 34 miles per hour σ(x) =
(
26.4/60
15
)
x. It is
important that I use mean national transportation costs because utility in the city
is “anchored” to the expected utility of a random move to anywhere in the United
States.
Finally, I make some simple assumptions. Households are made up of two adults,
so total time endowment per day is T = 48 hours. Work hours are N = 8 if one
partner works and N = 16 if both partners work. If both partners work, commute
costs naturally double.
8Subsection 3.5 shows that my results are not sensitive to the choice of these elasticities.
9Rappaport (2014) uses a much smaller number: 17 percent. In this case I am guilty of a bit of parameter-seeking.
The model starts to predict very high housing prices at low housing expenditure. Furthermore, 40 percent is a more
reasonable portion if we are considering expenditure of the urban poor (Castner et al. 2010).
10All dollar values are in 2017 dollars.
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3.4 Results
The model yields a stylized story of where the poor and the rich choose to live
in a metro with only one-income households versus a metro with only two-income
households. Figure 13 shows that if N = 8, then low-income households will out-
bid high-income households for the inner city. Consequently, the rich occupy the
suburbs. In order to understand how it is possible that the poor are willing to pay
more than the rich for centrality, we must consider carefully what the transportation
costs mean for each group. Since one partner does not work, both groups have a
substantial amount of hours available for non-work activities each day. But, cash
is in relatively short supply. Transportation costs are a larger portion of income
for the poor, so they are willing to pay more rent per square foot to avoid costly
commutes.
Figure 14 shows that everything changes when both partners work. Now hours
are in short supply and cash is abundant. Naturally, the extra cash causes all groups
to bid up rents everywhere. But, now that time for non-work activities is scarce,
the rich use their extra buying power to move closer to the central business district.
The rich experience lengthy commute times more acutely than the poor because
their marginal utility of leisure is higher. The image that should come to mind is
of the time-starved professional couple who elect not to move to the suburbs when
a baby comes because they simply do not have time for both partners to commute
half an hour twice a day.
This model is highly stylized. In reality there are a continuum of income groups,
these groups mix to a degree, and there were no discrete jumps from cities of one-
income households to cities of two-income households. Moreover, the rents in Figure
14 are rather high11 and the poor occupy an unrealistically large land area in Figure
13. Nevertheless, these simulations make the case that an increase in the prevalence
of two-income households is an internally consistent explanation for recent patterns
of gentrification.12
11This is probably because no city is actually made up entirely of two-income households. If this were the case,
$10,000 per month for a two-bedroom downtown apartment in a super-city might not be unheard of.
12For the curious reader, Figures 15 and 16 show the simulated housing demand, portion of expenditure on
housing, goods consumption and leisure time for the single and dual earner households. Notice that in Figure 16 as
rent approaches zero at around 17 miles, the model becomes unstable
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3.5 Robustness
Following Rappaport (2014) to choose the elasticities of substitution for the utility
function may not be fully justified. For instance, Rappaport chooses elasticities to
match population-weighted mean of the Frisch elasticity. But, since my model has
no notion of population, using Rappaport’s parameters seems arbitrary.
To test the sensitivity of my qualitative results to parameters, I performed the fol-
lowing experiment 50,000 times. First, I chose the elasticity of substitution between
housing and consumption γ−1
γ
by drawing at random from the uniform distribution
between 0.01 and 3. Second, I did the same for the elasticity of substitution between
leisure and other goods ρ−1
ρ
. Third, I drew the parameters η and δ at random from
the uniform distribution between 0.01 and 0.99.
With the four randomly chosen parameters in hand, I used equation 12 to com-
pute the slopes of the bid-rent functions for the rich and the poor at the intersection
point13 for N = 8. I then took the percent difference in slopes.14 Next, I computed
the percent difference in slopes of the rich and the poor for N = 16. Finally, I
compared the difference in differences between rich and poor for N = 8 and N = 16.
In 99.76% of the 50,000 trials, the rich bid-rent function steepened relative to
the poor bid-rent function when work hours increased. This means that in nearly
all cases, increasing work hours caused the rich to increase their bids for inner city
housing relative to the poor. Thus, I conclude that the increase in the slope of the
rich relative to the poor shown in Figures 13 and 14 to be almost totally insensitive
to choice of parameters for the utility function.
4 Empirical Analysis
Edlund et al. (2015) found that the rich are shortening their commutes nationwide
relative to the poor. They argue that this is because increasing returns to skill have
increased skilled work hours. In this framework, increasing returns to skill can also
explain the rising labor force participation of women and the rising prevalence of
13Since the wage is equal in the city and the reservation location, the bid-rent functions for the rich and the poor
intersect at the expected commute distance in the reservation location.
14Recall that whichever group has the steeper slope will occupy the city center.
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two-income households. My theory from the previous section suggested that, in fact,
a city that transitions from one-income households to two-income households will
see the rich shorten their commutes and the poor lengthen them, even if wages are
constant.
If increasing returns to skill really were driving gentrification in Washington DC,
we would expect the rich, married and unmarried, to shorten their commutes in
relative terms. This section will show the contrary. The married rich are increasing
their commutes relative to the poor, while the unmarried rich are not.
4.1 Summary Statistics
The raw data underlying the analysis in this section is the same IPUMS census
data as Section 3 (Ruggles et al. 2015). However, here I keep the data at the
individual level and use the years 1980 and 2010. Tables 3 and 4 display simple
summary statistics for commute time and wage income disaggregated by age and
marital status. Keep in mind that I included only individuals reporting a positive
commute time and personal wage income. The N column counts the individuals in
the age-marriage category before restriction. Commute times are in minutes and
incomes are in 2017 dollars.
4.2 Gentrification and the Married
In this subsection I present evidence that strongly suggests that it was primarily
young, married, high-income couples who drove gentrification in Washington DC
between 1980 and 2010. I do not have a well-identified natural experiment that can
confirm the causal mechanisms of these changes. However, the following figures and
regressions show that any causal explanation of gentrification must account for the
fact that it was not the young and skilled, but the young, skilled, and married who
were the primary gentrifiers in Washington DC.
The goal of the following procedure is to determine which groups increased their
commutes relative to others between 1980 and 2010 in Washington DC. For each
year, I gave each auto-commuting, income-earning individual their percentile rank
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in the income and commute time distributions in the years 1980 and 2010. Then,
I found the mean commute time percentile for each income percentile group. Since
these plots can be difficult to read, I took a moving average over the income percentile
distribution. The outcome is Figure 17.
Figure 17 shows that commute times tend to rise with income. This is consistent
with Figure 13. But, the top fifth of the income distribution has shortened its
commute times relative to the bottom four-fifths since 1980. Since Figure 1 leaves
no doubt that commute time is strongly correlated with centrality in Washington
DC, Figure 17 strongly suggests that the rich are moving relatively inward and the
poor are moving relatively outward.
Which populations are driving this trend? To find out, I partitioned the DC
auto-commuting, income-earning population into four groups according to marital
status and age. If an individual is legally married and their spouse is present, they
are considered “married.” If an individual is 35 years of age or younger, they are con-
sidered “young.” Cutting along these lines yields four disjoint groups that together
make up the entire auto-commuting, income-earning population of Washington DC.
Figure 18 shows the relationship between income percentile and commute time
percentile for those over 35 and married.15 Their trend appears to be almost identical
to the population in general. The richest fifth are shortening their commutes and
the rest are lengthening theirs.
Now consider the plot for the young and married (Figure 19). Young, married
individuals in the bottom fifth of the DC income distribution are lengthening their
commutes relative to the rest of the population, while young, married individuals
in the top four-fifths are shortening their relative commutes. In fact, the farther up
the income distribution we go, the greater the shortening effect. Thus, it appears
that the young and married are gentrifying to a greater degree than the rest of the
population.
Is it the young and not the married that drive this trend? Figure 20 presents
evidence to the contrary. Among this population, the rich do not appear to be
shortening their commutes.
15The percentile rankings correspond to the entire population, not of the partition.
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Finally, among those over 35 and unmarried (Figure 21), the trend is exactly the
opposite as those under 35 and married. The old and unmarried in the bottom fifth
of the income distribution are actually shortening their commutes, while the richer
individuals are lengthening their commutes. The fact that the young and married
exhibit the exact opposite trend as the old and unmarried is good evidence that
partitioning the population in this way reveals meaningful differences in trends.
To summarize, Figure 17 suggests that the rich are shortening their commutes
relative to the poor. Figure 19 suggests that the married, in particular the young
and married are driving this trend. The young and unmarried have no discernible
trend and the old and unmarried are opposing the trend.
4.3 Statistical Significance
A skeptic might note that the figures have been smoothed and wonder whether the
trends that Figures 17, 19 and 21 purport to show are statistically significant. They
may point out that since the unsmoothed figures are unreadable, the variance might
be too high to say for sure that these trends are as meaningful as they appear.
This skeptic would be wrong. Consider Table 5. This table shows five Ordinary
Least Squares regressions on auto commuters in Washington DC. The dependent
variable in each case is commute time percentile. The independent variables are
income percentile, a dummy variable which is 1 in 2010 and 0 in 1980, and the
interaction between the dummy and income percentile. Model 1 includes all income-
earning auto commuters in Washington DC in 1980 and 2010.16 Model 2 restricts
to those married and over 35. Model 3 restricts to those unmarried and over 35.
Model 4 restricts to the unmarried under 35. Model 5 restricts to the married under
35. The reader should keep in mind that the data are in repeated cross sections,
not a panel.
The coefficient on Decade x Income tells us how the effect of income on commute
time differed between 1980 and 2010. For the entire population (Model 1), a 1-point
increase in income percentile17 is associated with a .24 point increase in commute
16This is a repeated cross section, not a panel.
17When I say “increase” in income percentile, I mean observing a different individual in a higher percentile. The
data are repeated cross sections, not a panel.
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time percentile in 1980. In 2010, this weakened to a .20 point increase. Moreover,
this is a statistically significant change. This confirms my interpretation of the
gentrification trend in Figure 17.
Turning to Model 2, we find that for those older than 35 and married, a 1-point
increase in income percentile is associated with a 0.29 point increase in commute
time percentile in 1980. But, in 2010 this dropped to a 0.22 point increase. Since
the coefficient on Decade x Income is negative and statistically significant, my in-
terpretation of Figure 18–that gentrification among the old and married was similar
to the population at large–is confirmed.
In Model 3, we see that among those older than 35 and unmarried, a 1-point
increase in income percentile is associated with only a 0.07 point increase in commute
time percentile in 1980. In 2010, this actually jumped up to a 0.14 point increase.
Once again, the change is statistically significant. This is the opposite trend and
it matches my interpretation of Figure 21 that the old and unmarried are anti-
gentrifying.
Model 4 shows that, for the unmarried young, a 1-point increase in income rank
implies a 0.2 point increase in commute time rank in 1980. But, in 2010, there is no
statistically significant change in this relationship. This belies the fact that Model
4 has a larger sample size than Models 3 or 5, which do have statistical significance.
This confirms my interpretation of Figure 20 that the young and unmarried do not
appear to be gentrifying.
Finally, Model 5 shows that, for the young and married, a 1-point increase in
income percentile is associated with at .23 point increase in commute time percentile
in 1980. In 2010, this dropped to a mere 0.16 point increase. Not only is this drop
statistically significant, it is the largest in magnitude of any group. This supports
my interpretation of Figure 19 that the young and married appear to be gentrifying
more than any other group.
In summary, larger incomes are associated with longer commutes. But, between
1980 and 2010 this relationship weakened. For the young and married, the change
was the starkest. For the old and married, the change was typical of the population
at large. For the young and unmarried, there was no measurable change. Finally, for
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the old and unmarried, the relationship actually strengthened. Taken together, this
is evidence that the married, especially the young, make up most of the gentrification
in Washington DC between 1980 and 2010.
4.4 Including All Transport Modes
I have focused on auto commutes thus far because the theoretical model in Section 3
considered only one transportation mode. However, it is important to check whether
the empirical results from Section 4.2 and 4.3 hold in general.
Figures 22-26 correspond to Figures 17-21, but no longer restrict to auto com-
muters. I now include walkers, bicyclers, and those who take public transportation.
A glance at these figures confirms that the main results of Figures 17-21 remain
in essence, but are a bit noisier. Most commutes are lengthening, except those in
the top quintile. The young and married experience a stronger trend, the young
and unmarried experience no discernible trend, and those over 35 and unmarried
experience the opposite trend.
Table 6 tests the statistical significance of these trends in the same OLS regression
technique as in Table 5. The sign and significance of the critical Decade x Income
coefficient is unchanged in Models 2-5. I do lose significance in the disaggregated
Model 1, however.
About three quarters of the individuals in my sample commute by car or truck.
The trends outlined in subsections 4.2 and 4.3 seem to be mostly driven by auto
commutes. When I add the other transport modes, the signal becomes noisier, but
is still discernible. This is evidence that, regardless of whether the signal is local to
auto commuters, it is strong enough to dominate the entire sample and is therefore
worthy of documentation.
5 Conclusion
Increasing incomes and rents in central cities remains a national trend (Hwang et al.,
2016). Explanations for this reversal of suburbanization range from consumption
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amenity growth (Baum-Snow, 2016) to increasing returns to skills (Edlund et al.,
2015). Yet, sorting out the relative importance and causal relationships among these
forces remains a challenge.
In this paper, I propose an alternative narrative. Consider two high-earning
households: one single-earning and one dual-earning. The single-earner household
has less cash to pay the high urban rents but more time to sacrifice to long suburban
commutes. But, a time-starved professional couple is more likely to shell out a high
rent to delay a move to the remote suburbs. Thus, the high-wage household with
two earners is more likely to use its extra buying power bid up central city rents
than a high-wage household with only one earner.
I have argued that a transition toward two-earner households can explain the
demographic changes that have accompanied rising urban rents. An extended AMM
model suggests that this is a feasible hypothesis. Indeed, in the approximately
monocentric Washington DC, it is the married rich, not rich in general, who are
shortening their commutes.
There are of course, many limitations to this analysis. My model assumes only
two income groups and is somewhat sensitive to the choice of transportation costs.
Moreover, while the empirical analysis is highly suggestive, it has no causal identifi-
cation strategy. Thus, this paper should be considered an argument that identifying
an exogenous increase in dual-earning households in an urban area would shed a
great deal of light on the causes of gentrification in the United States.
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6 Tables
PUMAS: Washington DC (2000)
VARIABLE Units Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max Individuals
Mean Auto Commute Minutes 30.7 30.8 3.6 24.0 38.9 95,418
Mean Mass Commute Minutes 52.8 51.3 12.2 32.5 78.8 13,423
Median Wages $ (2017) 47,456 48,254 9,661 27,372 71,914 129,347
Median Rent $ (2017) 1274 1323 235 791 1869 21,419
Mean Age Years 34.9 34.5 2.54 30.9 41.1 230,508
College % 44.8 36.0 13.2 17.5 75.7 230,508
Married % 36.9 40.2 8.7 15.8 48.6 230,508
Table 1: Summary statistics for Washington DC in the year 2000 aggregated at the PUMA level.
There are 22 PUMA’s. Wages are only for individuals who made nonzero incomes. Rents include
utilities and are only for individuals who paid nonzero rents and rented two-bedroom dwellings.
Data Source: Ruggles et al. (2015)
PUMAS: Washington DC (2010)
VARIABLE Units Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max Individuals
Mean Auto Commute Minutes 30.9 30.8 3.9 23.7 40.1 21,327
Mean Mass Commute Minutes 52.9 51.6 12.5 32.1 81.5 3,741
Median Wages $ (2017) 50,903 49,318 13,030 22,417 80,703 29,677
Median Rent $ (2017) 1,589 1,570 292 1064 2466 4,607
Mean Age Years 36.7 36.6 2.3 30.8 41.4 53,811
College % 49.3 49.5 12.6 25.2 77.4 53,811
Married % 35.4 37.3 8.5 9.2 50.2 53,811
Table 2: Summary statistics for Washington DC in the year 2010 aggregated at the PUMA level.
There are 22 PUMA’s. Commute times only for auto commuters. Wages are only for individuals
who made nonzero incomes. Rents are only for individuals who paid nonzero rents and rented
two-bedroom dwellings. Data Source: Ruggles et al. (2015)
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Individuals: Washington DC (1980)
Year N % Auto Mean Auto Com. Mean Com. Median Income
All 35,174 71.9 26.7 28.4 41,248
Married, Over 35 11,244 79.3 28.3 29.9 60,881
Unmarried, Over 35 4,790 65.8 26.0 28.9 46,929
Married, Under 35 6,940 76.2 27.9 29.5 43,090
Unmarried, Under 35 11,264 64.8 24.0 26.0 27,796
Table 3: Summary statistics for individuals in Washington DC in the year 1980. Data Source:
Ruggles et al. (2015)
Individuals: Washington DC (2010)
Year N % Auto Mean Auto Com. Mean Com. Median Income
All 25,527 80.9 32.5 34.2 58,276
Married, Over 35 11,222 86.9 33.8 35.7 80,690
Unmarried, Over 35 5,695 77.3 32.0 34.7 61,638
Married, Under 35 2,328 84.0 33.2 34.58 56,034
Unmarried, Under 35 5,702 71.6 29.3 30.5 30,819
Table 4: Summary statistics for individuals in Washington DC in the year 2010. Data Source:
Ruggles et al. (2015)
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Automobile Commute Time and Income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES All Married > 35 Unmarried > 35 Unmarried ≤ 35 Married ≤ 35
Decade x Inc -0.0387*** -0.0685*** 0.0675*** 0.00392 -0.0689**
(0.00928) (0.0143) (0.0246) (0.0240) (0.0319)
Decade 2.423*** 4.078*** -1.818 1.806* 2.435
(0.537) (0.957) (1.485) (0.924) (1.704)
Income 0.240*** 0.293*** 0.0721*** 0.200*** 0.230***
(0.00622) (0.0102) (0.0188) (0.0139) (0.0162)
Constant 33.35*** 30.59*** 40.09*** 33.11*** 36.83***
(0.360) (0.699) (1.165) (0.577) (0.882)
Obs. 45,958 18,664 7,554 11,390 7,223
R-Squared 0.048 0.066 0.013 0.027 0.032
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 5: These Ordinary Least Squares regressions test whether the change in the relationship
between income and commute time between 1980 and 2010 is statistically significant. These re-
gressions consider only auto commuters. Only those unmarried and over 35 years of age experienced
no meaningful change. The purpose of the regressions is only to test whether measurable changes
occurred at all. No causal inference can be made.
26
Commute Time and Income for All Transport Modes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES All Old Married Old Unmarried Young Unmarried Young Married
Decade x Inc -0.0101 -0.0390*** 0.0991*** -0.00646 -0.0609**
(0.00813) (0.0131) (0.0208) (0.0199) (0.0282)
Decade 0.798* 2.780*** -4.489*** 0.450 2.104
(0.470) (0.885) (1.248) (0.780) (1.542)
Income 0.200*** 0.271*** 0.00794 0.162*** 0.200***
(0.00527) (0.00914) (0.0153) (0.0112) (0.0138)
Constant 35.80*** 31.60*** 45.71*** 35.83*** 38.04***
(0.305) (0.633) (0.939) (0.469) (0.777)
Obs. 60,701 22,466 10,485 16,966 9,268
R-Squared 0.038 0.062 0.006 0.017 0.026
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 6: These Ordinary Least Squares regressions test whether the change in the relationship
between income and mass transit commute time between 1980 and 2010 is statistically significant.
Groupwise sign and significance on interaction term is the same as for the auto commuters. The
purpose of the regressions is only to test whether measurable changes occurred at all. No causal
inference can be made.
27
7 Figures
Figure 1: In the Washington DC metro, the central city has the shortest automobile commute times. The
map for mass transit times is nearly identical
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Figure 2: In the Chicago metro, commute times are high in the central city.
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Figure 3: Concentration of Rent Growth Figure 4: Concentration of Income Growth
Figure 5: Congregating Young Figure 6: Congregating Couples
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Figure 7: Congregating College-Educated
Figure 8: Median real rent levels for 2-bedroom rented dwellings
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Figure 9: Median real annual personal wage income levels
Figure 10: Portion married levels
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Figure 11: Portion under 35 levels
Figure 12: Portion with any college education levels
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Figure 13: One worker: Simulated rent offered over distance for college-educated (red) and not
college-educated (blue).
Figure 14: Two workers: Simulated rent offered over distance for college-educated (red) and not
college-educated (blue). The model becomes unstable once rent approaches zero.
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Figure 15: Simulated variables for single-earner households.
Figure 16: Simulated variables for two-earner households.
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Figure 17: Auto commute time and income (smoothed).
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Figure 18: Auto commute time and income for the married over 35 (smoothed).
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Figure 19: Auto commute time and income for the married under 35 (smoothed).
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Figure 20: Auto commute time and income for the unmarried under 35 (smoothed).
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Figure 21: Auto commute time and income for the unmarried over 35 (smoothed).
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Figure 22: Commute time and income for all transportation modes (smoothed).
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Figure 23: All-mode commute time and income for the married over 35 (smoothed).
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Figure 24: All-mode commute time and income for the married under 35 (smoothed).
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Figure 25: All-mode commute time and income for the unmarried under 35 (smoothed).
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Figure 26: All-mode commute time and income for the unmarried over 35 (smoothed).
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